

On the grammatical category of spurious resultative predicates

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要旨

本論文では、見せかけの結果構文の定義について、いくつかの問題点を指摘する。アイスランド語のデータを使用し、一見副詞に見える結果句が実は形容詞であることを示す。さらに、結果構文の言い換えとして「*x causes y to become z*」には欠点があることを指摘し、代案として「*x causes y to become z by doing w to y**」という言い換えを提案する。結果として、見せかけの結果構文は独立した構文ではなく、派生的結果構文の一種となることを論じる。

1. Introduction

Ever since Simpson's first analysis of the Resultative Construction¹ (or RC for short) in 1983, explaining the various aspects of it has been a puzzle tackled by many linguists (for an overview see e. g. Levin and Rappaport Hovav 1995 or Boas 2003). Various analyzes, using numerous frameworks, have been offered (see e. g. Hoekstra 1988 for a syntactic analysis, Carrier and Randall 1992 for a syntactic/semantic analysis, Levin and Rappaport Hovav 1995 for a pure semantic analysis, Goldberg 1995 and Goldberg and Jackendoff 2004 for a Construction Grammar analysis, Levin and Rappaport Hovav 1999 and Rappaport Hovav and Levin 2001 for an event structure analysis, Boas 2003 for a corpus-based account, and Broccias 2008 for a historical account of the RC in English) and many have been shot down by counterarguments; with the end result being that the resultative construction is still in many ways a mystery. In this paper I argue for a universal account of all resultatives; and while I do not attempt to provide such an analysis in this paper; I do argue that such an analysis is desirable, showing that such an analysis is preferable to a split-analysis theory (Washio 1997, Kageyama 2007, 2009 et al), arguing that while there are variations to the RC, fundamentally it is preferable to analyze the variations as a single construction rather than numerous independent constructions.

¹ I use the term construction as a loose, general term, covering a range of sentence structures with the same or similar syntactic and semantic features; and not in the Construction Grammar sense a la Goldberg (1995) et al.

To start with, I will review a semantically-based split-analysis theory of resultatives proposed by Washio (1997) in section 2. While by no means the only such account, it has been influential and served as the basis for other research and is in many ways representative of them; and therefore the problems it creates have also remained unsolved. Section 3 will tackle those problems, showing that a split-analysis theory of resultatives (as it stands) is not feasible. In section 4 I will introduce data from Icelandic showing that the evidence in favor of the need for a split analysis can in fact be explained away, so that it is not directly relevant for the analysis of resultatives; and that, therefore, a unified analysis is preferable. Section 5 takes a closer look at the event structure of resultatives, showing that the variation between resultatives can in many ways be seen as a variation in the lexical information and not in the construction itself. Section 6 is dedicated to the conclusion.

2. Spurious resultatives: definition and diagnosis

In his 1997 paper, Washio proposes a three-way split of resultatives²: strong resultatives, weak resultatives, and spurious resultatives. This categorization, or a variation thereof, has been adapted by many researchers since (Suzuki 2007, Takamine 2007, Kageyama 2007, 2009, Miyakoshi 2009, Morita 2009 et al) and can therefore be seen as having been quite influential in regards to the starting point which many accounts of resultatives have taken.

Washio defines strong resultatives such as (1) as “[r]esultatives in which the meaning of the verb and the meaning of the adjective are completely independent of each other.” (1997: 7)

- (1) The horses dragged the logs smooth. (Washio 1997: (20a))

Here, the adjective smooth does not in any way repeat or modify the information entailed by the verb drag, but rather adds new information by predicating of the object; i. e. it is strong in the sense that it forces a different meaning to the sentence as a whole compared to the sentence in isolation (i. e. without the resultative phrase), which doesn’t entail a result per se.³

- (2) The horses dragged the logs.

Continuing, Washio defines weak resultatives such as (3) in the following way: “Let us call resultatives that are not “strong” in the above sense weak

² Washio limits his discussion to resultatives where the resultative phrase is an adjective; I will discuss this further in subsection 3.4.

³ I. e. in a sense which is relevant here. Of course one can easily imagine the logs ending up somewhere, although unspecified, as being a result of sorts.

resultatives.” (1997: 7-8)

(3) Mary dyed the dress pink.

(Washio 1997: (27a))

The verb dye does not directly entail the adjective pink, but it does evoke the notion of color, and pink can be seen as merely specifying the color which dye entails. These types of resultatives are weak in a sense that they are opposites of strong resultatives, and that the event depicted remains the same even without the resultative phrase; the dress is still seen as changing color.

(4) Mary dyed the dress.

Washio further argues that this division between strong and weak resultatives is apparent cross-linguistically and points out that while a language like Japanese has weak resultatives it does not allow strong resultatives and that therefore the distinction is not merely a descriptive one, but more importantly one of function, (1997: 8)

Finally, Washio (1997) also proposes a category which he calls spurious resultatives. But if strong resultatives are resultatives in which the verb and adjective are not semantically related, and weak resultatives covers everything which is not a strong resultative, that would appear to completely cover all resultatives. This raises the question why a third category, i. e. of spurious resultatives, is needed. Simply put, Washio (1997) does not view spurious resultatives as “true” resultatives. However, because of a tendency to group them with resultatives (Simpson 1983, Carrier and Randall 1992, Levin and Rappaport Hovav 1995), the resultatives tag is kept; with “spurious” used to discern them from other, true (strong and weak) resultatives.

(5) He tied his shoelaces tight.

(Washio 1997: (50))

(5) is an example of a spurious resultative, whose characteristics Washio lists as follows:

- (A) they involve an activity such that a particular manner of action directly leads to a particular state
- (B) it makes no significant difference if the adjective is taken as specifying the result state or specifying the manner of action so that, typically, the adjective can be replaced with the corresponding adverb with virtually no difference in meaning
- (C) they permit either one of the adjectives that form the antonym pair

- (D) the standard paraphrase (“x causes y to become z”) often fails, especially with one of the antonymous adjectives (Washio 1997:17)

The following examples show the validity of (B)-(D) while (A) applies to all (grammatical) examples:

- (6) He tied his shoelaces tight / tightly, (B) (Washio 1997: (53a))
 (7) He tied his shoelaces tight / loose, (C) (Washio 1997: (53))
 (8) *He caused the shoelaces to become loose (by tying them), (D) (Washio 1997: (52))

Because of these facts, Washio (1997) does not group spurious resultatives along with other (strong and weak) resultatives, but rather considers them to be “fake” resultatives, i. e. not resultatives at all. This also explains why spurious resultatives, which superficially resemble strong resultatives, are possible in languages such as Japanese, which otherwise do not allow strong resultatives.

As noted briefly above, this three-way distinction of what is often lumped into one category of resultatives helps explain cross-linguistic differences relating to resultatives. English allows all three groups; Japanese only allows weak and spurious resultatives; and French is even more restrictive in only freely allowing spurious resultatives (Washio 1997: 42-43). This solution is in many ways effective in explaining cross-linguistic differences, but there are some problems with Washio (1997)’s definition of spurious resultatives, and the three-way-split account as a result. I will turn to these problems in the next section.

3. Problems with spurious resultatives

3– 1. Adjectives and adverbs

A problem which arises due to Washio (1997)’s definition of spurious resultatives is how to categorize the sentence-final element (the ‘resultative phrase’⁴) in terms of its grammatical category. They are adjectives in the eyes of analyses viewing spurious resultatives as true resultatives (Simpson 1983 et al); and Washio (1997) also explicitly refers to them as adjectives, but here arises a discrepancy. It is not always clear from its syntactic position whether a word is an adjective or an adverb, as it indeed the case with resultatives; and while by no means foolproof, a way of deciding between adjectives and adverbs is to replace the word in question with a similar word, an adjective or an adverb, which grammatical category is beyond doubt. The argument goes that an adjective would only be replaceable by another adjective and the same goes for

⁴ The term ‘resultative phrase’ is commonly used for the sentence final element (AP or PP) in resultatives. I use it here simply as a cover term for these elements, and do not claim that it is in any way an independent lexical or functional “phrase” in the Generative Grammar sense.

adverbs. Replacing an adjective with an adverb or vice versa would result either in an ungrammatical sentence, or it would change the syntactic structure of the sentence in a way which would presumably change the way it is parsed, and hence the meaning would also be different. If it is true that in spurious resultatives the sentence-final word can be freely replaced with a 'corresponding adverb' as per the Washio (1997)'s definition of spurious resultatives above, then the word replaced would also be classified as an adverb, and hence, according to the more traditional analyses of the resultative construction, we would not be dealing with a resultative construction in the first place.

Now if we take a closer look at (6) above, we see that tight can be replaced by tightly with what Washio (1997) refers to as 'virtually no difference in meaning' according to condition (B) above. Given that tightly is without doubt an adverb, due to the fact that it ends in -ly (Hurford 1994: 10-11), assuming Washio's analysis is correct, we should conclude that in this case tight also serves the role of an adverb. This, of course, runs counter to Washio's supposition. This presents us with two possibilities: One; that words such as tight are in fact adverbs, and sentences such as (6) are therefore not examples of a resultative construction. This would relieve us of having to explain examples such as (6) and furthermore make Washio's definition of spurious resultative redundant seeing as their sentence structure would be S V O AdvP and not S V O AP as we have invariably with true resultatives (Washio 1997: 1). Or two; that tight in (6) is truly an adjective, and that while it is possible to replace it with tightly resulting in a sentence close in meaning (or even 'virtually no difference in meaning'), the difference in meaning is in fact present, and relevant enough to incur two different analyses of these sentences. This is the explanation which I will adapt throughout the remainder of this paper.

A final problem for condition (B) is that even for many true resultatives, the sentence-final adjective can be replaced with a 'corresponding' adverb resulting in a sentence of similar meaning.

(9) She wiped the table clean / cleanly. (modified from Washio 1997: (48))

(10) I froze the ice cream solid / solidly. (modified from Washio 1997: (27a))

When is the difference in meaning large enough to justify that we are dealing with two separate constructions is a question that is left unanswered. Of course, these examples do not provide a direct argument against condition (B), but the fact that this possibility is not limited to spurious resultatives, but is also available to (some) true resultatives does weaken its stance as a characteristic of spurious resultatives seeing as it is not unique to them.

In section 4 I will present novel data from Icelandic showing that, at least

when it comes to Icelandic, the sentence-final element in resultative sentences is unquestionably an adjective. In the next section, however, I turn to the paraphrasing of resultatives.

3 – 2. Paraphrasing resultatives

Turning to Washio (1997)'s condition (D) regarding spurious resultatives, he notes that the 'standard paraphrase' "x causes y to become z" often fails with spurious resultatives. While often needs to be clarified, this statement presents additional problems. As mentioned above, many analyses of the resultative construction have been proposed, and similarly the diagnosis of resultatives has also been a matter of debate; with the diagnosis adapted clearly able to influence the resulting analysis. Now the paraphrase "x causes y to become z" may be used to paraphrase the meaning of a resultative sentence, but while the paraphrase does serve its purpose by being an easy-to-understand rewording of the meaning of a resultative sentence, it is in fact lacking in that not all resultative sentences can be rephrased using this paraphrase.

(11) The joggers ran the pavement thin. (Washio 1997: (22a))

(11) is an example of a strong resultative. Let us paraphrase (11) using condition (D), keeping in mind that the fact that condition (D) should (often) fail when it comes to spurious resultatives by definition implies that both strong and weak resultatives should hold up when paraphrased. If not, then the fact that it sometimes fails for spurious resultatives would be inconsequential.

(12) *The joggers caused the pavement to become thin by running (it),
(on the meaning intended)

The fact that the paraphrase "x causes y to become z" does not hold up for a true resultative such as (12) gives us no reason to conclude that it should without exception hold up for spurious resultatives either.

A further example of this is the paraphrase of (13) in (14)

(13) He spread the butter thick / thickly. (Washio 1997: (54a))

(14) ≠ He caused the butter to become thick (by spreading it).
(Washio 1997: (54b))

While the paraphrase in (14) may be considered a grammatical sentence; the fact remains that its meaning differs from that of (13), a spurious resultative according to Washio (1997), and it is therefore not really a paraphrase of it

at all, To force a periphrastic reading of (14) does, as expected, produce an ungrammatical sentence, I will come back to the reasons behind this phenomenon in section 5.

This paraphrasing also presents an additional argument against freely replacing sentence-final adjectives with adverbs, as we see that even for spurious resultatives, where the paraphrase holds up for adjectives as in (15), the paraphrase is nonetheless impossible when the adjective has been replaced by an adverb (both are paraphrases of (6)).

(15) He caused his shoelaces to become tight (by tying them).

(16) *He caused his shoelaces to become tightly (by tying them).

This of course should come as no surprise due to the nature of the paraphrase requiring an adjective rather than an adverb, but if as Washio (1997) argues that the meaning is the same regardless of whether there is an adjective or adverb in (6), the difference in acceptability between (15) and (16), which presumably should also have the same meaning, i. e. the meaning of (6) does require and explanation.

I will return to the paraphrasing of resultatives in section 5, showing why condition (D) is inadequate for paraphrasing not only spurious resultatives but resultatives in general, and propose a new paraphrase which takes into account non-syntactic factors relevant to the event description.

3 – 3. Antonym pairs in spurious resultatives

Condition (C) states that spurious resultatives “permit either one of the adjectives that form the antonym pair” (Washio 1997: 17). This is exemplified by (7); repeated here as (17).

(17) He tied his shoelaces tight / loose. (modified from Washio 1997: (53))

Simply put, the fact that He tied his shoelaces tight is an acceptable spurious resultative means that the same sentence only with tight replaced by its antonym, in this case loose, also results in not only a grammatical sentence, but a spurious resultative too. As Washio notes, this contrasts with weak resultatives which “generally permit only one the adjectives forming the antonym pair” (1997: 17) as the following example shows.

(18) He wiped the table dry / *wet. (modified from Washio 1997: (38)-(39))

Washio uses this observation to argue that in the case of loose, it modifies the

way the agent, he, tied the shoelaces, and not the resulting state of them (1997: 17). Furthermore, he argues that the paraphrase in condition (D) does not hold in the case of loose.

- (19) *He caused his shoelaces to become loose by tying them.
 (on the meaning intended) (Washio 1997, (52))

This observation however, brings us to the root of the problem created by examples such as (17). This is the fact that the word loose is polysemic, with at least two similar yet differing meanings. One is an antonym of tight as in The knot is tight / loose (i. e, the knot is tied, with the state of it being either tight or loose). This is the meaning which Washio (1997) assigns it. The other meaning, the meaning which is truly relevant in these examples, is the one where loose is an antonym of tied. This is best exemplified by the following example.

- (20) His shoelaces are loose, \Leftrightarrow His shoelaces are tied.

To repeat, this meaning of loose is the one which applies in (19). This naturally causes a contradiction by stating that he caused the shoelaces to become loose (i. e, not tied) by tying them, as we have a separate lexical item for untying shoelaces. This is why (19) is not an acceptable paraphrase of (17) where another meaning of loose is used.

Furthermore, as already noted above, in the case of spurious resultatives the sentence-final adjectives can be replaced by equivalent adverbs, which in this case are tightly and loosely respectively.

- (21) He tied his shoelaces tightly / loosely.

As expected, (21) holds up. What is interesting however is what happens when negation is added to the mix.

- (22) He didn't tie his shoelaces tight / *loose.
 (23) He didn't tie his shoelaces tightly / loosely.

Again, tight and tightly hold up as predicted. Curiously though, while loose is not acceptable; its supposedly corresponding adverb loosely is perfectly fine. While Washio (1997)'s theory cannot account for this discrepancy, the simple fact that we are dealing with a polysemic loose, where only the first meaning of it can be replaced by loosely (presumably by being closer in meaning), handily explains it. Furthermore, this difference in meaning also accounts for the incompatibility of

the paraphrase of (17) in (19), rendering conditions (C) and (D) irrelevant.

In this section, I have shown that what may at first sight appear as an antonym pair of adjectives does not necessarily have to be one. This provides a challenge for the definition of spurious resultatives, in particular conditions (C) and (D), a challenge which is easily solved by adapting a polysemic analysis of the adjectives in question.

3 – 4. Non-adjectival resultatives

Broadly speaking, English resultatives can be divided into adjectival resultatives and prepositional resultatives, depending on whether the resultative phrase is an AP or a PP. It should be noted, however, that resultatives where the resultative phrase is a NP or even an AdvP have been observed in English (Carrier and Randall 1992, Broccias 2004), but they are not as frequent or productive as other resultatives; and perhaps therefore AP and PP resultatives have been the main focus of research, which is the line I will follow here. Ideally, in a theory accounting for both AP and PP resultatives, the handling of NP and AdvP resultatives should fall directly in place without any further modifications.

- (24) The gardener watered the tulips flat, (AP)
(Carrier and Randall 1992: (1a))
- (25) The grocer ground the coffee beans (in)to a fine powder, (PP)
(Carrier and Randall 1992: (1b))
- (26) They painted their house a hideous shade of green, (NP)
(Carrier and Randall 1992: (1c))
- (27) Sally painted the room beautifully, (AdvP) (Broccias 2004: (4a))

Of course, as with many other aspects of resultatives, the treatment of PP resultatives has been a matter of some debate. While some research lumps them in with AP resultatives, aiming at a unified treatment (Wechsler 1997, Rappaport Hovav and Levin 2001), others discern between the two, with some even going as far as rejecting PP resultatives as true resultatives, instead analyzing them as e. g. a variant of the caused motion construction (Goldberg 1995).

- (28) The general marched the soldiers to the tents.
(Levin and Rappaport Hovav 1995: (19b))

This is the approach Washio (1997) takes, noting that PP resultatives (S-V-O-PP) need separate treatment (Washio 1997: endnote 4). It could still be argued that, if at all possible, a theory of resultatives should account for them; either by explaining why these are not true resultatives, in which case they can be

excluded from further discussion, or, in the case that they are viewed as true resultatives, they must be adequately accounted for, and their characteristics explained in the same way as AP resultatives. Ideally, this explanation would be a unified theory covering all resultatives, showing that the similarities rise above the differences in grammatical category.

To sum up, not only PP but also NP and perhaps even AdvP resultatives must be accounted for in one way or another. Admittedly, it could be argued they are not relevant to the point of Washio (1997)'s paper, and while that may well be, the fact remains that the frequency and productivity of PP resultatives is such that simply sweeping them under the carpet cannot be considered ideal.

3–5. Summary

In this section, I have taken a close look at Washio (1997)'s definition of spurious resultatives, in particular focusing in the four conditions, (A)-(D), which he lists for spurious resultatives. Putting aside the first condition for the moment, I have shown that there are problems with this definition. In subsection 3.1 I showed that condition (B) is not limited to only spurious resultatives, but can also apply to true resultatives. Furthermore, in either case it is not clear whether the similarity in meaning between the corresponding adjectives and adverbs is relevant when it comes to the treatment of adjectival resultatives. Subsection 3.2 analyzed the paraphrasing of resultatives as covered by condition (D) and showed that as it stands it is an inadequate representation of resultatives, and that the fact that it sometimes fails for spurious resultatives is not because of a property of spurious resultatives but rather because of limitations caused by the (sometimes) inaccurate paraphrase. Subsection 3.3 looked at condition (C) in more detail, showing that antonyms and apparent antonyms must be treated with caution so as not to overgeneralize over only apparent antonyms. Lastly, subsection 3.4 pointed out that any unified theory of resultatives should account for all resultatives, not just AP resultatives. As for condition (A), it is a decidedly loose rephrasing of the meaning of resultatives in general, and in no way more relevant to spurious resultatives than to true resultatives or even other constructions.

Finally, I must note that while I may seem harsh in my criticism of Washio (1997), in particular when it comes to the treatment of spurious resultatives, the paper is of much interest and offers novel insight into resultatives on a whole; in particular the division into strong and weak resultatives and showing that it is cross-linguistically relevant. The problems arising can on the whole be attributed to the ambiguity of the English language, an ambiguity which causes vagueness and presents difficulties when dealing with something as fickle as resultatives. In the next section, in an effort to resolve this matter, I will offer an analysis spurious resultatives using data from Icelandic, showing that they can in fact be

considered true resultatives, and aim to integrate them with the split between strong and weak resultatives.

4. When an adjective is truly an adjective, and spurious resultatives are true resultatives

4 – 1. Resultatives in Icelandic

Icelandic has received considerable attention from linguists, in particular syntacticians, for its somewhat unique properties offering insight into various aspects of language not as readily observable with other more common languages such as English (Thráinsson 2007). When it comes to resultatives, however, Icelandic has not been the focus of much attention; to my knowledge the only works focusing on resultatives in Icelandic have been two articles by Matthew Whelpton, a short paper from 2007 and a longer, more comprehensive draft from 2006 (Whelpton 2006, 2007), with only brief mentions elsewhere, such as in Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995).

- (29) Þeir máluðu húsið hvítt.
 they_mNP painted house_the_nAS white_nAS⁵
 'They painted the house white.' (Levin and Rappaport Hovav 1995: (31a))
- (30) Ég bað þá að mala kaffið fínt.
 I_NS asked them_mAP to grind coffee_the_nAS fine_nAS
 'I asked them to grind the coffee fine.'
 (Levin and Rappaport Hovav 1995: (32a))

On the whole, Icelandic (adjectival) resultatives are similar to English resultatives in their distribution with regards to transitivity (Whelpton 2006, 33). However, as Whelpton (2006) points out, there arises a problem with (30). Adjectives in Icelandic inflect for number, gender, and case, matching the noun they modify (which have a grammatical gender and also inflect for number and case). Furthermore, adjectives have strong and weak inflectional paradigms, corresponding to the definiteness of the noun they modify.

- (31) svarta_mAP hesta_mAP "black horses" (strong inflection)
 (Whelpton 2006: (39))
- (32) svörtu_mAP hestana_mAP "the black horses" (weak inflection)
 (Whelpton 2006: (40))

⁵ For convenience I have adopted the glossing method used in Whelpton (2006) where an inflected word is followed by a three-letter code composed of the initial letters of the features it bears: the first letter indicates gender (masculine, feminine, or neuter), the second case (Nominative, Accusative, Dative, or Genitive), and the third letter indicates number (Singular or Plural). For example, hesta_mAP indicates that the word is masculine, Accusative, and Plural.

When used predicatively, however, the inflection on the adjective is always strong.

- (33) Hestar / Hestarnir eru svartir.
 horses_mNP / horses_the_mNP are black_mNP
 'Horses / The horses are black.' (modified from Whelpton 2006: (41))

Complicating the matter is the fact that in Icelandic adjectives can also be used adverbially, where they always take the strong accusative neuter singular form (Whelpton 2006: 7).

- (34) Nú er of langt gengið!
 now is too long_nAS gone
 'Now it's gone too far!' (Whelpton 2006: (45))

This is relevant in examples such as (30) above, where the adjective *fint* "fine" is in the accusative neuter singular form, the same form as *kaffið* "coffee_the" and therefore it cannot be easily determined whether it is being used adjectivally or adverbially, i. e. whether we have a true resultative example or not. The matter on how to resolve this problem will be taken up in the next subsection.

4 – 2. Agreement in resultative constructions

As mentioned above, agreement features on adjectives and nouns are prevalent in Icelandic. This provides us with much more information with regards to the relation between a (predicative) adjective and a noun than in a language such as English. In other words, it makes it easier to tell if a word is truly an adjective instead of an adverb, as adjectives can take all numbers, genders and cases, while, as noted above, adverbs (or adjectives used adverbially) are limited to strong accusative neuter singular form.

- (35) Hann malaði kaffibaunirnar fint.
 he_mNS ground coffee-beans_the_fAP fine_nAS
 'He ground the coffee beans finely,' (Whelpton 2006: (90))
- (36) Hann muldi piparkornin fint.
 he_mNS ground peppercorns_the_nAP fine_nAS
 'He ground the peppercorns finely,' (Whelpton 2006: (91))

In the examples above, Whelpton (2006) argues that the sentence-final element is an adverb and not an adjective based on the fact that the sentence-final element *fint* "finely" does not agree with the gender and number features of the object

in (35) or the number feature of the object in (36). This fact is reflected in the English translation of the examples, where the adverb *finely* is used instead of an adjective, *fine*, and hence these examples are not in fact true resultatives, but rather what according to Washio (1997) would be classified as spurious resultatives.

This is not the end of the story, however, as we can also have regular adjectival agreement on the sentence-final elements.

- (37) Hann malaði kaffibaunirnar finar.
 he_mNS ground coffee-beans_the_fAP fine_fAP
 'He ground the coffee beans finely.'
 (38) Hann muldi piparkornin fin.
 he_mNS ground peppercorns_the_nAP fine_nAP
 'He ground the peppercorns finely.'

Here the sentence-final element inflects for the number, gender, and case features on the respective objects, and we have what is unquestionably an adjective, and therefore also true examples of the resultative construction.

In the case of English, Washio (1997) made the argument that these adjectives were in fact adverbs in disguise, based on the fact that they can be freely replaced with corresponding adverbs. This, however, is no longer possible for Icelandic as the adjectives bear full inflection, and even though we have examples such as (35) and (36) with what would appear as adverbs, the similarity in meaning is merely coincidental, based on the fact that we are dealing with predicates of similar meaning.

Having confirmed that examples such as (37) and (38) are indeed true resultatives, let us take another look at the examples in (35) and (36) where agreement between the object and the sentence-final element does not occur. As noted above, Whelpton (2006) classifies the sentence-final elements in those sentences as adverbs, citing the fact that they do not agree with the object with regards to one or more features. While it is clear that agreement between these two elements does not occur, to conclude that we are therefore dealing with adverbs may be a step too far. After all, these elements bear number, gender, and case markings; and rather than to simply conclude that they do not agree with the direct object and are therefore adverbs, we might investigate why they show the behavior that they do. Similar to the differences between (35)-(36) and (37)-(38) we have the following.

- (39) Járnsmiðurinn hamraði málminn flatt / flatan.
 blacksmith_the_mNS hammered metal_the_mAS flat_nAS / flat_mAS

- 'The blacksmith hammered the metal flat,'
 (40) Hann batt skóreimarnar fast / fastar.
 he_mNS tied shoelaces_the_fAP tight_nAS / tight_fAP
 'I tied the shoelaces tight(ly).'

These both have translation equivalents in English, with (40) being a spurious resultative. The English translation of (39), however, is clearly not a spurious resultative but rather a strong resultative. But the question arises why, considering both an adjective and an adverb (for the moment I will assume that the non-agreeing form is an adverb) are available in Icelandic, one of the examples translates as a strong resultative, while the other as a spurious resultative. Of course this phenomenon could easily be caused by cross-linguistic differences between Icelandic and English, and if so, that would be the end of discussion. There is, however, the possibility that both are in fact true (i. e. strong) resultatives, especially considering the historical relation between the two languages (Baugh and Cable 2002). This would of course mean that the non-agreeing sentence-final word is an adjective and not an adverb (or an adverbial use of an adjective). But why does it then not agree with the object it is supposedly predicated of? The answer is that it does agree with something, but that something is not overtly expressed in the syntax, but rather covertly available in the semantic interpretation of the event structure depicted by the respective sentences. The adjectives of course still have the option to directly agree with the object they are predicated of, meaning both forms of the adjective are acceptable. Even though I claim that these forms are in agreement with something, I will continue to refer to them as non-agreeing forms for ease of exposition.

There are, however, times when one of the two forms is not available. This is invariably the non-agreeing form of the adjective, lending further support to the fact that we are in all cases dealing with true resultatives, with (41) being one such example,

- (41) Illi andinn slengdi honum flötum / *flatt.
 evil_mNS spirit_the_mNS threw him_mDS flat_mDS / flat_nAS
 'The evil spirit threw him flat,' (modified from Whelpton 2006: (74))

Here the agreeing form flötum "flat" is perfectly fine, while the non-agreeing flatt "flat" results in an ungrammatical sentence. As expected, the English translation is a strong resultative. To answer why the non-agreeing form is not available in cases such as (41), we must take a closer look at the event structure depicted by the sentence in question. When there is something available in the

event structure, something not represented overtly in the sentence, the adjective can choose to agree with that something. But the fact that this something is not represented overtly (i. e. syntactically) also means that it doesn't have any of the particular syntactic features (number, gender, or case) required for agreement to be expressed. Hence, the adjective takes a form which could be considered as a default form, the accusative neuter singular, because of the requirement that these features must be filled in order for the adjective to be expressed (Radford 2009: 288)⁶. Not incidentally, this default form is the same form as adjectives take when they are used adverbially, *a la* (34), which should be clear considering that in those cases the adjective in question has no syntactic constituent to agree with (or in the case where a constituent carrying the required number, gender, and case features is present, it is semantically implausible (or even impossible) for the adjective to be predicated of (i. e. agreeing with) that particular constituent).

Returning to the question why this is not always an option, such as in (41), this is simply a characteristic of the event structure depicted by the sentence, where the adjective *flötum* "flat" cannot plausibly agree with something other than the word it is predicated of, i. e. the direct object *honum* "he". Because it cannot agree with anything besides the direct object, the adjective therefore must agree with the number, gender, and case features of the object in question, i. e. dative singular masculine in the case of (41), resulting in the form *flötum* "flat", and not a different form.

In this section I have shown that, at least in the case of Icelandic, the difference between what Washio (1997) classifies as strong resultatives and spurious resultatives is not in fact a feature of the construction (i. e. there being two different constructions, one for each type of resultative), but rather that it can be thought of as a characteristic of the event structure depicted by each sentence, influenced by the lexical items present in each case. When the event structure allows it, the adjective has the choice of appearing in a non-agreeing (with respect to the direct object) form. When not permitted by the event structure, however, the adjective is limited to an agreeing form. Note that this agreeing form must always be available, irrespective of whether it or a non-agreeing form is chosen, and in some ways the agreeing form could therefore be considered more basic; at least when it comes to resultatives; and the non-agreeing form a possible derivative thereof, enabled by the rich inflectional morphology of Icelandic. Why this would be I leave for further research.

⁶ Alternatively the covert element has the default nAS features which the adjective then inherits. I will not go into this matter further here.

4 – 3. The case of English from the Icelandic perspective – What are spurious resultatives?

Now to return to the resultative construction in English; and how closely related to the resultative construction in Icelandic it is. While certainly different languages, they are historically related (Baugh and Cable 2002), belonging to the Germanic branch of the Indo-European language tree, and while it is unclear whether the resultative construction had developed as a productive construction before these languages become independent of each other (Broccias 2008), it is still not unreasonable to conclude that due to parallel changes in the two languages, what we are dealing with is essentially one and the same construction, as is argued by Whelpton (2006).

But that raises the question why, if spurious resultatives in Icelandic are in fact true resultatives as is argued above, this is not clear from the supposedly equivalent construction in English. In other words, why was it necessary to turn to examples from Icelandic in order to observe the shortcomings in the definition of spurious resultatives, when we should have the same construction in English, and therefore the same characteristics also? The reason for this should of course be clear by now, because, as pointed out above, English, unlike Icelandic, is an inflectionally impoverished language, not showing the essential inflectional paradigms between an agreeing adjective and an adverb necessary to accurately discern between them, and therefore being ambiguous not only in regards to the meaning of a sentence, but also as to the characteristics (i. e. grammatical category) of the elements of the construction in question. Consider (5), repeated here as (42): a spurious resultative per Washio (1997)'s definition,

(42) He tied his shoelaces tight.

As expected, the Icelandic translation equivalent allows both an agreeing and a non-agreeing form of the adjective.

(43) Hann batt skóreimarnar fastar / fast.
 he_mNS tied shoelaces_the_fAP tight_fAP / tight_nAS
 'He tied the shoelaces tight.'

Which form of the adjective, *fastar* or *fast* is applicable here cannot be determined due to the impoverish inflection on the English *tight*. However, this is not crucial for the argument at hand, since, as was shown above, both of the Icelandic forms are in fact adjectives, and we can therefore conclude that while the English *tight* does not show any inflections, and is therefore ambiguous between an adjective and an adverb, the parallelism between English

and Icelandic means that it is in fact an adjective, and what appears to be non-agreement is so only on the surface. By extension we could argue that there are in fact two different forms of the adjective in English, just like in Icelandic, but that these two forms just happen to be identical. In either case, we would still be dealing with pure adjectives.

In summary, the resultative construction in English can be viewed as a parallel of the resultative construction in Icelandic. Furthermore, seeing as spurious resultatives are in fact true resultatives in Icelandic, we cannot but conclude that the same applies for English. This also means that spurious resultatives are simply a subcategory of all (true) resultatives in English, creating a three-way split between weak resultatives, strong resultatives, and spurious resultatives. I will continue to use the term 'spurious resultatives' for coherence, as this can be considered an established term, and is in many ways descriptive of the construction. There is, however, nothing 'holy' about this three-way split, and in some ways spurious resultatives can be considered a subclass of strong resultatives. The connection between the two, and ways to discern between them, will be covered in the next section.

5. The event structure of "spurious resultatives" and the paraphrasing of resultatives in general

Turning to the paraphrasing of (the meaning of) resultatives in general, we have seen that the paraphrase "x causes y to become z" does not only fail for only some spurious resultatives, as Washio (1997) argues, but for many true resultatives also; leaving us to conclude that the problem lies not with spurious resultatives, but with the paraphrase itself (see section 3.2). Consider the spurious resultative in (44) and its paraphrase in (45), which is marginal at best.

(44) He tied his shoelaces tight.

(45) ?*He caused his shoelaces to become tight by tying them.

This is because it is difficult to imagine a situation where the shoelaces themselves can be considered tight, as can be seen by the unacceptability of the following example.

(46) *The shoelaces are tight.

Rather, we would use something similar to the example in (47).

(47) The knot / shoe is tight.

What is tight are not the shoelaces themselves, even though they were the object of the tying action, but rather the knot(s) (or even the shoe(s)) created by the tying action. Accordingly, the following paraphrase holds up.

(48) He caused the knots / shoes to become tight by tying the shoelaces.

Here we have all the required elements: the actor “He”, the action “tying the shoelaces”, and the result “the knots / shoes [became] tight”. More importantly, the meaning of (48) is the same as the meaning of (44), and so it holds up as a paraphrase. By analogy, we can re-paraphrase (49), not with the ungrammatical (8), repeated here as (50), but with (51).

(49) He tied his shoelaces loose.

(50) *He caused the shoelaces to become loose by tying them.

(51) He caused his shoes to become loose by tying the shoelaces.

This shows that while it may be hard to conceive the shoelaces themselves to become loose by tying them, there is nothing wrong with the situation where the shoelaces are tied in such a way that the shoes themselves are loose (i. e. not tight, as expected seeing as loose and tight are antonyms; see section 3.3).

Analyzing (48) and (51), we can create the following skeletal structure for the paraphrasing of spurious resultatives.

(52) “x causes y to become z by doing w to y*” (where y* is in a intrinsic relation to y)

With this skeletal structure we simply have to plug in the applicable lexical elements to have an appropriate paraphrase of a spurious resultative. The requirement for y* to be in an intrinsic relation to y is intentionally left vague, as this can cover a large area depending on the event being described; an example is that of shoelaces and shoes, where the two are undoubtedly in some sort of ‘relation’, with the shoelaces possibly being interpreted as parts of the shoes. Let us look at some further examples.

(53) He spread the butter thick.

(54) ???He caused the butter to become thick by spreading it,

(on the meaning intended)

(55) He caused the layer of butter to become thick by spreading the butter.

Here (54) is unacceptable as a paraphrase of (53). While this may be expected

by the argument of Washio (1997), the reason for this is not simply that (53) is a spurious resultative. To better understand this, we must realize that butter is in fact a liquid, and that in the realm of liquids, thick has the meaning of being concentrated or condensed. When referring to a layer of butter, however, we are no longer dealing with a liquid but a solid layer, with the meaning of thick consequently changing. This is why (54), while on its own a perfectly acceptable sentence, is not an appropriate paraphrase of (53). This problem can be easily solved by using the paraphrase model in (52) as can be seen by the example in (55).

In the same way, we have the following example.

(56) He sliced the mushrooms thin.

(57) ?*He caused the mushrooms to become thin (by slicing them).

(58) He caused the mushroom slices to become thin by slicing the mushrooms.

(57) is unacceptable because what becomes thin are not the mushrooms themselves, but rather the slices of mushrooms created by the slicing action. This is represented in (58).

Finally, we can also see that the paraphrase model in (52) applies not only to spurious resultatives, but also to true resultatives, in which case we simply have $y^*=y$.

(59) The blacksmith hammered the metal flat.

(60) ?The blacksmith caused the metal to become flat by hammering the metal.

(60) may sound unnecessarily wordy and convoluted, with the simpler "The blacksmith caused the metal to become flat" being preferred. This, however, is not a defect of the paraphrase per se, but rather an example of the shorter, more concise version being preferred as per Grice's Maxim of Quantity (Wardhaugh 1992: 290).

In this section I touched upon a few of the reasons why the "standard paraphrase", "x causes y to become z", often fails when it comes to resultatives. It is of course impossible to rationalize this for every instance of a (spurious) resultative, as the reason is often tied to the structure of the event in question, with each event having to be treated individually. I offered a few examples of the reasoning process behind this, and expect the remaining examples to fall in place. Furthermore, I offered a new paraphrase model, adapted to paraphrase spurious resultatives in particular, but also showed that it can be taken to apply to all resultatives in general.

6. Conclusion

Washio (1997)'s three-way categorization of resultatives into strong, weak, and spurious resultatives has offered new insight into research on resultatives and has consequently been influential on research which has followed. As we have seen, however, it is not without faults. In particular, there are problems with the definition of spurious resultatives, and the need for them as a separate construction is not rationalized in the way the difference between strong and weak resultatives is.

Washio (1997) does not make it clear whether we are dealing with adjectives or adverbs when it comes to the sentence-final element of spurious resultatives. While he refers to them as adjectives, the fact that they are (supposedly) freely replaceable by corresponding adverbs raises questions about their grammatical category. While the meaning of the sentence may remain unchanged, or close to it, when an adjective is replaced by an adverb or vice versa, the difference in grammatical category alone suggests that we are dealing with two separate constructions. If their meaning happens to be identical then so be it; it can be seen as a mere similarity without any further bearing on the constructions under discussion. In addition, I presented novel data from Icelandic, showing that while Icelandic spurious resultatives to some degree have the same flexibility as English spurious resultatives, in that there are often more than one form of an adjective acceptable, for Icelandic those elements are unquestionably adjectives as can be seen by the fact that they bear agreement features which are distinct from adverbs. By extension we are also dealing with true adjectives in spurious resultatives in English. And seeing as they are true adjectives, we have no reason to believe that we are not dealing with true resultatives as well.

Furthermore, the argument that antonym pairs of adjectives may appear in the same spurious resultative - i. e. that an adjective can be replaced with its antonym without any loss in grammaticality - and that this contrasts with true resultatives where such replacement supposedly fails also poses problems due to the polysemic nature of many adjectives in English as was shown in subsection 3.3. What may appear to be an antonym pair sometimes isn't one in the condition under question. As a result, I do not view this feature of some spurious resultatives to be evidence enough to rationalize a separate category for them. Rather, I see this as a result of the productivity of resultatives in general, and if semantically and pragmatically allowed, it should be perfectly natural that antonym pairs of adjectives can appear as resultative phrases.

Finally, I questioned the viability of the paraphrase "x causes y to become z", and showed that, while it may be a convenient way to rephrase resultatives and to explain them, it only holds true for some resultatives, be they true resultatives or spurious resultatives. As a result, the fact that the paraphrase is

not applicable to all spurious resultatives is not a feature of spurious resultatives, but rather a limitation of the paraphrase itself. Consequently, the use of the paraphrase cannot be seen as an adequate test for spurious resultatives, and we lose a method of distinguishing them from true resultatives. Instead, I proposed a revised paraphrase, “x causes y to become z by doing w to y*”, and showed that it applies to all resultatives, true and spurious, and that it holds up even in cases where the previous paraphrase failed.

Considering all this evidence, I see no reason to view spurious resultatives as a separate construction from other resultatives; but rather see them as a subpart of resultatives in general, and possibly strong resultatives in particular; and leave the question up in the air whether it is a discernible subpart or not. This fact of course can be seen as having wide-reaching consequences, as not only does it call for a rethinking of much theoretical work, but also a re-analysis of the data available to those who research the resultative construction. Including spurious resultatives in the data may of course cause problems, introducing examples which cannot be accounted for in an adequate manner by current theories. Yet seeing as we have no empirical evidence to exclude them, any theory not accounting for them cannot be seen as complete. And that is exactly what should be sought after, a complete, unified theory of the resultative construction, as even though some aspects of it may be relatively clear, we cannot claim to have fully understood it until we have accounted for all its parts, both independently and collectively, in one combined theory.

I see this paper as a stepping stone towards such a unified theory, but there are still many remaining hurdles. Resultatives with prepositional resultative phrases show a different distribution when it comes to productivity compared to adjectival resultatives (Boas 2003), and there exist subject-oriented transitive-based resultatives as pointed out by Rappaport Hovav and Levin (2001) et al, which do appear to go against the Direct Object Restriction, a syntactic feature of resultatives requiring the resultative phrase to be predicated of an element which originates as a direct object (or which can be analyzed as one during the derivation) (Levin and Rappaport Hovav 1995). These characteristics must also be accounted for. Finally, the crosslinguistic aspect of resultatives must be looked at closer; for example Washio (1997)’s insights into the differences between English, French, and Japanese need to be reinvestigated if we are to categorize spurious resultatives as true resultatives, which would pose problems for the tree-way distinction. Due to space restrictions I leave these problems for further research.

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